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Apr 18, 2024
Apr 17, 2024
A Political Pandemic
The Georgia Republican continues to insist that Russian President Vladimir Putin isn’t so bad.
Marjorie Taylor Greene is seen in profile
Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene doesn’t think Russia’s military incursion into Ukraine is a threat to the rest of Europe, and she wishes everyone would shut up about it.
“This whole thing is the most repulsive, disgusting thing happening, and the American people are the ones writing the check,” the far-right Georgia congresswoman said Friday in an interview on Steve Bannon’s War Room program. “Vladimir Putin has not said he wants to go march across Europe and take Europe, and the reality is Ukraine is not even a NATO member nation.”
It’s quite a bold claim to make, considering that European countries in addition to Ukraine have made no secret that they fear Russia. For example, Germany, Poland, and France are discussing the revival of a decades-old alliance to strengthen their cooperation because of Russia. Sweden just joined NATO last month, following neighbor Finland’s accession to the alliance last year, over concerns Russia might try to invade them next.
So, is Greene simply echoing Russian talking points? Several of her Republican colleagues in Congress have warned that Russian propaganda is influencing their constituents and politicians like Greene, following revelations last week of a vast Russian-backed corruption network in Europe. Belgium is even investigating Russian interference in the European Parliament’s upcoming elections.
Former Colorado Representative Ken Buck even came up with a derisive nickname for Greene due to her pro-Russia stance.
“Moscow Marjorie is focused now on this Ukraine issue and getting her talking points from the Kremlin and making sure that she is popular, and she is getting a lot of coverage,” he said in an interview on CNN Monday.
Greene has turned her guns on Speaker Mike Johnson in recent weeks due to her opposition to any aid for Ukraine in its fight against Russia, with Republicans bitterly divided over the issue. The fight could cost Mike Johnson his speakership, which is held together by a razor-thin Republican margin in the House. Greene even put forth a motion to oust him last month, although it has not yet been brought for a vote.
A former CIA officer explains how a vast, pro-Putin corruption network uncovered in Europe is a warning sign for the U.S.
Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene is known by some of her Republican peers as “Moscow Marjorie.”
Democrats for years have warned about Russian influence in the Republican Party under Donald Trump. But now even some prominent GOP members of Congress are sounding the alarm.
“I think Russian propaganda has made its way into the United States, unfortunately, and it’s infected a good chunk of my party’s base,” Representative Michael McCaul, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told Puck’s Julia Ioffe last week. Representative Mike Turner, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, went further, telling CNN’s Jake Tapper a few days later, “We see directly coming from Russia attempts to mask communications that are anti-Ukraine and pro-Russia messages, some of which we even hear being uttered on the House floor.”
Which Republicans might they be referring to? Representative Ken Buck didn’t hesitate to point a finger at Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, saying on Monday, “Moscow Marjorie is focused now on this Ukraine issue and getting her talking points from the Kremlin and making sure that she is popular and she is getting a lot of coverage.”
They’re saying aloud what they once whispered behind closed doors. Back in 2016, when he was a Republican congressman but not yet House speaker, Kevin McCarthy said in a private meeting with GOP leaders, “There’s two people, I think, Putin pays: [Representative Dana] Rohrabacher and Trump … swear to God.” (Rohrabacher, once dubbed “Putin’s favorite congressman,” lost his seat in 2018.)
McCarthy, confronted with the leaked audio in 2017, claimed it was a joke. But anyone paying attention to how Russian intelligence services run influence operations—which I do, as a former CIA officer—knows it is anything but. It raises a legitimate, and deadly serious, question: Have Russian operatives paid any Republican officials?
Consider the news last week that authorities in several European countries had uncovered a vast corruption network, in which European politicians were paid to spread anti-Ukraine and pro-Russia propaganda. The network, according to intelligence sources cited by Czech media and confirmed by the country’s prime minister, was orchestrated by pro-Russia Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk. Politicians from Germany, France, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Hungary were allegedly paid directly with cash or through cryptocurrency exchanges.
The case highlights an important misunderstanding that arose during Trump’s first presidential campaign, about how malign influence operations work: They are not simply, or even primarily, bot or troll networks on social media that amplify lies and propaganda. They’re human intelligence operations too—not unlike what you might see in a Hollywood film. Operatives of Russia’s security services meet with politicians, journalists, activists, and other influencers and pay them to carry out certain tasks.
The idea is to push narratives and policies that help Russia but to mask them behind a local face. (In the aforementioned case, the popular website Voice of Europe was allegedly used to push the propaganda and to facilitate payments.) This provides Russia plausible deniability, but it also makes it more likely that audiences will trust the messages. It serves a purpose within Russia too, as domestic propaganda purportedly showing that people in other countries agree with the Kremlin’s positions.
The Voice of Europe scandal is merely the latest example of Russian influence on the continent. Last year, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project revealed that politicians in Germany, Italy, and Cyprus were paid by Russian operatives to introduce legislation literally written by Russian intelligence officers. The OCCRP also uncovered examples of parliamentary staff members, party activists, and members of think tanks publishing articles in European press outlets under their name, while the articles were actually written by Russian handlers. One activist from Austria even complained to his handler about the quality of one article that had been coordinated with the Kremlin. “I am not a robot,” he said. Nevertheless, he published the article under his name in a Swiss media outlet.
It is naïve to think the same pattern does not exist in the United States, given the ample evidence of coordinated pro-Russian talking points from several Republican politicians. Just this week, Marjorie Taylor Greene spoke to Steve Bannon about Ukraine’s persecution of Christians, which is a Kremlin talking point aimed at boosting the pro-Moscow wing of Ukraine’s Orthodox Church. The U.S. should be spending money on the border with Mexico, not on Ukraine aid? That’s a Kremlin talking point. Russia invaded Ukraine to defend itself against an expanding NATO? That’s a Kremlin talking point. Call for a cease-fire, and give Russia Crimea and eastern Ukraine? That’s a Kremlin talking point.
While we cannot say for sure if any Republican officials are on the Russian payroll in ways similar to their European counterparts, we can be sure that they’ve been approached. As the director of national intelligence wrote in 2021, Russian intelligence operatives and their proxies “sought to use prominent US persons and media conduits to launder their narratives to US officials and audiences. These Russian proxies met with and provided materials to Trump administration-linked US persons to advocate for formal investigations; hired a US firm to petition US officials; and attempted to make contact with several senior US officials. They also made contact with established US media figures.”
As for payments, we’ve seen a disturbing pattern. In 2017, Andrew Intrater donated $250,000 to Trump’s inauguration fund and, a few months later, donated $35,000 to Trump’s reelection campaign. Intrater is a cousin of Viktor Vekselberg, a Russian oligarch who was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2018 for his connections to Putin. We know that oligarchs play an integral role in funding Russian influence operations. One oligarch revealed to special counsel Robert Mueller that Putin held quarterly meetings with his oligarchs to discuss strategic spending.
In 2018, a Texas-based firm donated money to House Speaker Mike Johnson. That firm is 88 percent owned by three Russians. And last week, we learned that Trump Media received loans from a Russian bank to help the company stay afloat before it went public and at a time when no U.S. bank would lend to Trump.
Any donations that might have been made through anonymous LLCs to PACs—perhaps with attached quid pro quos—are likely to remain opaque, due to the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision. And we cannot say if the financial transactions we do know about are nefarious. But the pattern paints a disturbing picture, particularly given many House Republicans’ rabid opposition to Ukraine aid and Trump’s reported Ukraine peace plan, which would cede Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine to Russia. A similar plan was floated by Paul Manafort, Trump’s 2016 campaign chairman, and his partner Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian intelligence operative, during the 2016 election.
Among the entities promoted by the Voice of Europe propaganda network was Hungary’s Center for Fundamental Rights, which “considers preserving national identity, sovereignty, and Judeo-Christian social traditions as its primary mission.” CFR is funded by the government of Viktor Orbán and has twice organized a conference in Budapest for the Conservative Political Action Committee, which helps shape policy on the American right. The Heritage Foundation—which has spearheaded Project 2025, the authoritarian blueprint for a future Republican administration—has become increasingly cozy with Hungary, and even hosted Orbán privately last month. It is quite possible, perhaps even likely, that some people who are on the Russian payroll were at the Heritage event, their role to influence and build support for pro-Russian policies.
We now have overwhelming evidence of vast pro-Russian influence operations throughout Europe that seek to exploit politicians, media personalities, and others—and some of these efforts have been successful. Here in the United States, while a pattern has emerged, we don’t know the full extent of the influence yet. But it would be foolish, not to mention dangerous, to think we are immune.
A Fraud In So Many Ways
If Trump had to back up his threats himself, the world would see what a whiny-butt pussy he really is.
Former President Donald Trump reportedly spent “several seconds” glaring at New York Times political reporter Maggie Haberman as he exited his criminal trial in New York City on Monday. Trump is charged with 34 felony counts of falsifying business records to hide hush money payments to cover up extramarital affairs. Jury selection began on Monday, marking the first time a former U.S. president has stood trial on criminal charges. He has pleaded not guilty.
Haberman apparently raised the former president’s ire by reporting from inside the courthouse that he fell asleep during the lengthy proceedings. “Former President Donald J. Trump seemed alternately irritated and exhausted Monday morning,” Haberman wrote on the Times liveblog, adding, “Mr. Trump appeared to nod off a few times, his mouth going slack and his head drooping onto his chest.”
“Trump has apparently jolted back awake, noticing the notes his lawyer passed him several minutes ago,” Haberman added a few minutes later.
Law360 court reporter Frank Runyeon detailed Trump’s exit from the courtroom, “After the thirty-some jurors remaining file out of the room for a brief afternoon break, Trump rises. After the jurors leave the courtroom, he stares over at DA Alvin Bragg. Then Trump turns his eyes to the press pool. As he exits, he glares at New York Times reporter Maggie Haberman for several seconds as he walks out.”
Haberman has had a famously up-and-down relationship with Trump as access to the former president during his 2016 campaign and first term in office landed her scoop after scoop. In recent years, however, she published a very critical book about his rise to power and has been a target of the former president’s anger – including being called “Maggot Hagerman” by the GOP’s presumptive nominee for president.
Today's Wingnut
No one speaks for a god that doesn't exist, so anyone can speak for that "god".
These jagoffs get wealthy simply by developing a good pitch, and growing their mailing list.
And one of the best gimmicks is to feign outrage when somebody points out their failings, because then the congregation can sit there and think, "Well, he's not talking about me - I'm a good little believer. He's mad at all those others - those heathens ..." blah blah blah.
And BTW, when this guy conflates "stolen 2020 election" with his little spiel about "faith" and "prophesy", we know a coupla things:
- Religion is politics - it's the original politics (IMO)
- It's not just a matter of using god to back up your political stance, it's using a political structure to enforce a religious doctrine
- Lots of people can be very susceptible to a God-Anointed King set up because they feel the need to be told what to do, which they think absolves them from a certain level of responsibility
- And that's why the founders told us to keep that shit separate
The Truth Will Out
How did they go from "fuck your feelings" and "poor little snowflake" to being so absolutely terrified of words and ideas?
Or maybe the chest-beating alpha macho crap was all bluff-n-bluster the whole time.
It's risky.
It can feel like you're
betting your whole existence
on a single act of defiance -
but eventually, you have to kick
that bullying son of a bitch
right in the balls.
Apr 16, 2024
Today I Learned
The whole story is far more gruesome than what's related on the historical marker. This joint has been pretty fucked up for as long as we've been here.
An Explainer
BKjr is either wacked out beyond any reasonable assessment, or a complete shit-weasel.
And I'll go ahead and say what is needless to say:
Don't vote for that prick
More Trump Lunacy
And they're planning on doing it all again - but even more this time.
These assholes won't quit until they've torn us down completely, in order to put us on an equal footing with their fellow assholes - like Putin and Xi and Orban - dividing the world into nuclear-armed corporate entities - operating the whole planet as one big worldwide conglomerate.
Trump trade advisers plot dollar devaluation
Advisers close to the former president — particularly his former trade chief Robert Lighthizer — are considering policies that would weaken the dollar relative to other currencies, which could juice U.S. exports but also fuel inflation.
Economic advisers close to former President Donald Trump are actively debating ways to devalue the U.S. dollar if he’s elected to a second term — a dramatic move that could boost U.S. exports but also reignite inflation and threaten the dollar’s position as the world’s dominant currency.
The idea is being discussed by former trade chief Robert Lighthizer — a potential Treasury secretary pick for Trump and the architect of the former president’s bruising tariff campaign against China — and policy advisers allied with him, according to three former Trump administration officials granted anonymity to discuss confidential policy plans.
Purposely devaluing the U.S. dollar by pressing other countries to alter their own currency values would represent the most aggressive proposal yet in Trump’s attempts to reshape global trade. The potential moves would go beyond the tariffs of Trump’s first term and the expansive industrial subsidies for clean energy enacted by President Joe Biden. A weaker dollar would make U.S. exports cheaper on the world market and potentially reduce the U.S.’ yawning trade deficit.
“Currency revaluation is likely to be a priority for some members of a potential second Trump administration, mainly because of the viewpoint that [an overvalued dollar] contributes to the trade deficit,” said one former Trump administration official, adding that Lighthizer and his team are the primary advocates for the approach.
But weakening the dollar could have other far-reaching consequences, from sending consumer prices for imported products soaring, to inviting retaliation from other countries and threatening the dollar’s role as world reserve currency, which would undermine U.S. sanctions on adversaries like Iran and Russia.
The potential policy shift during a second Trump term could further fragment the global economy — a post-pandemic trend top finance officials are already grappling with as they gather in Washington this week for the yearly Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Each of the former officials stressed that all of the “nuances” of the currency policies are not worked out yet, and could shift before or after the election. Among other things, Lighthizer is considering ways to weaken the dollar unilaterally or through negotiations with foreign nations using the threat of tariffs, the former officials said.
Lighthizer — one of the few Cabinet members to survive Trump’s full first term — retains significant influence on the former president’s trade and economic policies from his post as the trade chief at the America First Policy Institute, a think tank set up to devise policies for a second Trump administration.
But such efforts would face stiff opposition from Wall Street and its supporters in Washington because a weaker dollar could make assets based on the currency less valuable. Should Trump tap one of the finance executives he’s also considering to lead the Treasury Department, it’s much less likely he would pursue currency devaluation.
“This would only happen if Bob [Lighthizer] was the Treasury secretary,” a second former Trump administration economic official said.
Trump’s first administration dabbled in currency policy back in 2019 by taking the rare step of designating China a currency manipulator, meaning it was unfairly devaluing its currency, the yuan, to make its exports cheaper and gain an advantage in global trade. But that designation took place after Trump had already imposed tariffs on the Chinese economy, and his White House never went further to address the currency imbalance with policies like the ones that Lighthizer is considering today. Biden did not renew China’s designation as a currency manipulator when he took office.
The former president’s allies in Congress say they would not be surprised if a new Trump administration — particularly with Lighthizer in a position of influence — tries to do more.
“The perspective that I know [Lighthizer] brings is that when countries like China manipulate their currency, we should address that,” said Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-Tenn.), who was ambassador to Japan under Trump and worked closely with Lighthizer. “That sort of inherent unfairness is what Bob was constantly talking about, and I respect his position.”
Lighthizer declined to comment, and the Trump campaign didn’t respond to a request for comment. But the former trade adviser endorses the idea of dollar devaluation in his 2023 book, No Trade Is Free, writing that it is “clear” that the dollar is “well overvalued” and that the U.S. could make a number of moves to correct that imbalance.
Lighthizer “frequently” brought up currency devaluation during Trump’s first term, said one former administration official with knowledge of the discussions, as did Trump economic adviser Peter Navarro. But they faced opposition from Wall Street-aligned officials like Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and former National Economic Council Chair Gary Cohn, and the idea never got off the ground. Trump even reportedly squashed a dollar devaluation proposal from Navarro during a White House meeting, POLITICO reported in 2019.
“Lighthizer brought that up all the time because he felt like tariffs weren’t enough to achieve the objective” of rebalancing trade with the rest of the world, said one of the former Trump administration officials. “Mnuchin didn’t want to do it.”
Mnuchin is not alone. Wall Street banks and large U.S. retailers would also oppose efforts to weaken the U.S. dollar, arguing it would hurt U.S. consumers and drive up already problematic inflation. Other corporate actors worry about the ripple effects if the U.S. government moves into currency markets aggressively, concerned it could spark a global trade conflict.
Robert Lighthizer testifies before the Senate Finance Committee on Capitol Hill.
Lighthizer’s ideal situation is to try to strike a grand bargain with foreign governments on currency, similar to the Plaza Accords struck by the Reagan administration in 1985 that weakened the dollar relative to the Japanese yen and European currencies. | Susan Walsh/AP
The ultimate effects of an “orderly and durable devaluation” of the dollar would be “uncertain” for American business, said Jake Colvin, president of the National Foreign Trade Council, which represents dozens of the largest U.S. companies. But, he added, “there is the additional risk that pursuit of a weaker dollar could spark a number of unintended consequences including inflationary global currency and trade wars.”
National security hawks also worry that weakening the dollar could take the bite out of U.S. sanctions on foreign countries like Russia and Iran. Those sanctions rely on the dollar’s use as the dominant currency in world trade and finance. If the dollar was devalued enough to make other nations switch to using another currency in international transactions, the U.S. Treasury would no longer have the ability to freeze those assets, as it has done with officials in adversarial nations.
“Sanction effectiveness depends on the U.S. having a world reserve currency,” said the first former Trump administration official, “and so I think there’s a clear tension there between two objectives — one of reducing the trade deficit and two of ensuring that there’s sanctions effectiveness.”
In theory, dollar devaluation could happen through multiple avenues. Lighthizer’s ideal situation, as outlined in his 2023 book, is to try to strike a grand bargain with foreign governments on currency, similar to the Plaza Accords struck by the Reagan administration in 1985 that weakened the dollar relative to the Japanese yen and European currencies.
It’s “very clear” that such a pact will be “an objective of folks like Lighthizer” if they retake the White House, said the former Trump administration official.
When the Plaza Accords were negotiated in the 1980s, the implicit threat of tariffs from the U.S. government — then, pushed by Democratic members of Congress — helped push foreign governments to renegotiate their exchange rates.
World governments should expect the tariff threat to be more explicit if Lighthizer is empowered in a future Trump administration, said the former officials with knowledge of the plans, noting that Lighthizer endorses the idea in his book, saying that it’s “hard to believe” other nations would have agreed to the Plaza Accord “if they had not been concerned about the possibility that Congress would raise tariffs.” The administration could even impose tariffs preemptively and then offer currency negotiations as a way to get the duties reduced, the former officials added.
Short of a multilateral agreement, the Trump administration could use the threat of tariffs to force individual countries — especially China — to the table for bilateral currency negotiations, said the former officials. One legal tool that’s been floated is Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorizes tariffs of up to 15 percent against countries that have “large and serious” trade surpluses with the U.S.
The Trump administration could also impose across-the-board tariffs on imports, making them more expensive for U.S. consumers, the former officials said. Trump is considering a 10 percent universal import tariff, the former administration officials said, and one result of that policy could be to make the dollar weaker relative to other currencies.
But even economists that support a currency revaluation stress that those approaches have drawbacks — even from the perspective of reducing the trade deficit, one of Lighthizer’s clear goals. Unless there is a multilateral grand bargain like the Plaza Accords — which even Lighthizer’s allies acknowledge will be difficult — trading partners could negate efforts to weaken the dollar by cutting their own interest rates, imposing their own tariffs or subsidizing their domestic producers, all of which could undermine the effect of U.S. policy shifts.
“One of the problems with many of these solutions is that countries that are determined to implement mercantilist policies can get around the solutions very quickly,” said Michael Pettis, a Beijing-based economist influential among economic advisers to both Trump and Biden. “It’s the countries that don’t ‘cheat’ that pay the cost.”
And the rubes go right along with it, cheering on this self-destructive version of globalization even as they constantly bitch about "the globalists".
Advisers close to the former president — particularly his former trade chief Robert Lighthizer — are considering policies that would weaken the dollar relative to other currencies, which could juice U.S. exports but also fuel inflation.
Economic advisers close to former President Donald Trump are actively debating ways to devalue the U.S. dollar if he’s elected to a second term — a dramatic move that could boost U.S. exports but also reignite inflation and threaten the dollar’s position as the world’s dominant currency.
The idea is being discussed by former trade chief Robert Lighthizer — a potential Treasury secretary pick for Trump and the architect of the former president’s bruising tariff campaign against China — and policy advisers allied with him, according to three former Trump administration officials granted anonymity to discuss confidential policy plans.
Purposely devaluing the U.S. dollar by pressing other countries to alter their own currency values would represent the most aggressive proposal yet in Trump’s attempts to reshape global trade. The potential moves would go beyond the tariffs of Trump’s first term and the expansive industrial subsidies for clean energy enacted by President Joe Biden. A weaker dollar would make U.S. exports cheaper on the world market and potentially reduce the U.S.’ yawning trade deficit.
“Currency revaluation is likely to be a priority for some members of a potential second Trump administration, mainly because of the viewpoint that [an overvalued dollar] contributes to the trade deficit,” said one former Trump administration official, adding that Lighthizer and his team are the primary advocates for the approach.
But weakening the dollar could have other far-reaching consequences, from sending consumer prices for imported products soaring, to inviting retaliation from other countries and threatening the dollar’s role as world reserve currency, which would undermine U.S. sanctions on adversaries like Iran and Russia.
The potential policy shift during a second Trump term could further fragment the global economy — a post-pandemic trend top finance officials are already grappling with as they gather in Washington this week for the yearly Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Each of the former officials stressed that all of the “nuances” of the currency policies are not worked out yet, and could shift before or after the election. Among other things, Lighthizer is considering ways to weaken the dollar unilaterally or through negotiations with foreign nations using the threat of tariffs, the former officials said.
Lighthizer — one of the few Cabinet members to survive Trump’s full first term — retains significant influence on the former president’s trade and economic policies from his post as the trade chief at the America First Policy Institute, a think tank set up to devise policies for a second Trump administration.
But such efforts would face stiff opposition from Wall Street and its supporters in Washington because a weaker dollar could make assets based on the currency less valuable. Should Trump tap one of the finance executives he’s also considering to lead the Treasury Department, it’s much less likely he would pursue currency devaluation.
“This would only happen if Bob [Lighthizer] was the Treasury secretary,” a second former Trump administration economic official said.
Trump’s first administration dabbled in currency policy back in 2019 by taking the rare step of designating China a currency manipulator, meaning it was unfairly devaluing its currency, the yuan, to make its exports cheaper and gain an advantage in global trade. But that designation took place after Trump had already imposed tariffs on the Chinese economy, and his White House never went further to address the currency imbalance with policies like the ones that Lighthizer is considering today. Biden did not renew China’s designation as a currency manipulator when he took office.
The former president’s allies in Congress say they would not be surprised if a new Trump administration — particularly with Lighthizer in a position of influence — tries to do more.
“The perspective that I know [Lighthizer] brings is that when countries like China manipulate their currency, we should address that,” said Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-Tenn.), who was ambassador to Japan under Trump and worked closely with Lighthizer. “That sort of inherent unfairness is what Bob was constantly talking about, and I respect his position.”
Lighthizer declined to comment, and the Trump campaign didn’t respond to a request for comment. But the former trade adviser endorses the idea of dollar devaluation in his 2023 book, No Trade Is Free, writing that it is “clear” that the dollar is “well overvalued” and that the U.S. could make a number of moves to correct that imbalance.
Lighthizer “frequently” brought up currency devaluation during Trump’s first term, said one former administration official with knowledge of the discussions, as did Trump economic adviser Peter Navarro. But they faced opposition from Wall Street-aligned officials like Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and former National Economic Council Chair Gary Cohn, and the idea never got off the ground. Trump even reportedly squashed a dollar devaluation proposal from Navarro during a White House meeting, POLITICO reported in 2019.
“Lighthizer brought that up all the time because he felt like tariffs weren’t enough to achieve the objective” of rebalancing trade with the rest of the world, said one of the former Trump administration officials. “Mnuchin didn’t want to do it.”
Mnuchin is not alone. Wall Street banks and large U.S. retailers would also oppose efforts to weaken the U.S. dollar, arguing it would hurt U.S. consumers and drive up already problematic inflation. Other corporate actors worry about the ripple effects if the U.S. government moves into currency markets aggressively, concerned it could spark a global trade conflict.
Robert Lighthizer testifies before the Senate Finance Committee on Capitol Hill.
Lighthizer’s ideal situation is to try to strike a grand bargain with foreign governments on currency, similar to the Plaza Accords struck by the Reagan administration in 1985 that weakened the dollar relative to the Japanese yen and European currencies. | Susan Walsh/AP
The ultimate effects of an “orderly and durable devaluation” of the dollar would be “uncertain” for American business, said Jake Colvin, president of the National Foreign Trade Council, which represents dozens of the largest U.S. companies. But, he added, “there is the additional risk that pursuit of a weaker dollar could spark a number of unintended consequences including inflationary global currency and trade wars.”
National security hawks also worry that weakening the dollar could take the bite out of U.S. sanctions on foreign countries like Russia and Iran. Those sanctions rely on the dollar’s use as the dominant currency in world trade and finance. If the dollar was devalued enough to make other nations switch to using another currency in international transactions, the U.S. Treasury would no longer have the ability to freeze those assets, as it has done with officials in adversarial nations.
“Sanction effectiveness depends on the U.S. having a world reserve currency,” said the first former Trump administration official, “and so I think there’s a clear tension there between two objectives — one of reducing the trade deficit and two of ensuring that there’s sanctions effectiveness.”
In theory, dollar devaluation could happen through multiple avenues. Lighthizer’s ideal situation, as outlined in his 2023 book, is to try to strike a grand bargain with foreign governments on currency, similar to the Plaza Accords struck by the Reagan administration in 1985 that weakened the dollar relative to the Japanese yen and European currencies.
It’s “very clear” that such a pact will be “an objective of folks like Lighthizer” if they retake the White House, said the former Trump administration official.
When the Plaza Accords were negotiated in the 1980s, the implicit threat of tariffs from the U.S. government — then, pushed by Democratic members of Congress — helped push foreign governments to renegotiate their exchange rates.
World governments should expect the tariff threat to be more explicit if Lighthizer is empowered in a future Trump administration, said the former officials with knowledge of the plans, noting that Lighthizer endorses the idea in his book, saying that it’s “hard to believe” other nations would have agreed to the Plaza Accord “if they had not been concerned about the possibility that Congress would raise tariffs.” The administration could even impose tariffs preemptively and then offer currency negotiations as a way to get the duties reduced, the former officials added.
Short of a multilateral agreement, the Trump administration could use the threat of tariffs to force individual countries — especially China — to the table for bilateral currency negotiations, said the former officials. One legal tool that’s been floated is Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorizes tariffs of up to 15 percent against countries that have “large and serious” trade surpluses with the U.S.
The Trump administration could also impose across-the-board tariffs on imports, making them more expensive for U.S. consumers, the former officials said. Trump is considering a 10 percent universal import tariff, the former administration officials said, and one result of that policy could be to make the dollar weaker relative to other currencies.
But even economists that support a currency revaluation stress that those approaches have drawbacks — even from the perspective of reducing the trade deficit, one of Lighthizer’s clear goals. Unless there is a multilateral grand bargain like the Plaza Accords — which even Lighthizer’s allies acknowledge will be difficult — trading partners could negate efforts to weaken the dollar by cutting their own interest rates, imposing their own tariffs or subsidizing their domestic producers, all of which could undermine the effect of U.S. policy shifts.
“One of the problems with many of these solutions is that countries that are determined to implement mercantilist policies can get around the solutions very quickly,” said Michael Pettis, a Beijing-based economist influential among economic advisers to both Trump and Biden. “It’s the countries that don’t ‘cheat’ that pay the cost.”
No - we don't want government
to be run like a business.
Because no business is a democracy.
Every business is a dictatorship.
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